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US-KOREAN RELATIONS: 
THE EVOLVING MISSILE CONTEXT 
EDWARD A. OLSEN 
Introduction 
U.S.-Korean relations have been influenced by diverse 
factors over the years. Political, economic, and strategic 
parameters have shaped and reshaped U.S. relations with both 
South and North Korea, and strongly influenced the 
circumstances of inter-Korean relations. Two characteristics 
have dominated these factors. First, there is a prevailing 
tendency to focus on momentous events such as the impact of 
the Korean War, the Cold War, political successions, and 
periodic crises of one sort or another. As corollaries of these 
major events, an array of precipitating factors have played a 
causal role in U.S.-Korean relations. A second characteristic is 
the endemic interplay between the policies of both the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) vis-a-vis U.S. policy toward either Korea and 
vis-a-vis each other. In short, the evolution of U.S.-Korean 
relations has been subject to many nuances. 
Missiles & Deterrence 
In the post-Cold War years, U.S. policy toward the Korean 
peninsula has been transformed by the changing geopolitical 
dynamics of the region and the world. A series of changes in 
U.S., ROK, and DPRK policies have raised new hopes and new 
questions. A current issue of great import is the role of missiles 
in the evolving situation. To understand why missiles have 
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been, and are, important in shaping the context of U.S.-Korean 
relations, it is worth reviewing from a broad-based geopolitical 
perspective how missiles have been dealt with in Korea, and by 
Koreans, over the years. 
Missiles have played a key role on, and around, the Korean 
peninsula for most of the post-Korean War years. As the 
United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear 
weaponry deliverable via intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), those weapons constituted the means for superpower 
deterrence, which formed the framework for the two Koreas' 
geopolitical roles throughout the remainder of the Cold War. 
This framework was derivative of the limited war doctrines 
partially spawned by the Korean War and made the Korean 
peninsula balance of power a prime example of escalation 
avoidance on the part of the Cold War adversaries, as well as 
illustrating the ways in which each country's policies toward 
Korea were designed to keep its adversary's Korean junior 
partner from upsetting that balance. l 
Despite the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union 
did not deviate from that goal. and despite both countries' 
recognition of the importance of ICBMs - and later on, naval 
launched missiles - for superpower deterrence, the ways 
Washington and Moscow dealt with Korea's role in that 
deterrence system evolved differently over time. Within the 
U.S.-ROK strategic relationship, Washington extended to 
Seoul the stable protection assured via the United States' 
nuclear umbrella, utilizing U.S. missiles as delivery systems. It 
is important to note that this was part of a much larger U.S. 
strategy designed to reassure a range of allies and to signal the 
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and their 
allies about the extent of the United States' commitment and the 
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nature of U.S. deterrence.2 It also is important to note that this 
U.S. policy sent other signals to many of the protected allies, 
and their regional adversaries, about the United States' 
intention to minimize missile proliferation as much as possible. 
This was clearly the case in U.S.-ROK security relations, and in 
neighboring U.S.-Japan security relations, in which both allies 
were discouraged from pursuing their own missile (and 
nuclear) options. 
Although certain aspects of U.S. deterrence policy could 
plausibly be interpreted by North Korea's leaders - if they 
chose to - as a form of double containment (in that U.S. policy 
constrained South Korea's alternatives), Pyongyang's strategic 
parameters were more strongly influenced by other pressing 
factors as the post-Korean War years evolved. Because of the 
tensions fostered by the Sino-Soviet split, and diverging 
Chinese and Soviet approaches to coping with the United States, 
North Korea found itself without the type of deterrence-based 
safety net enjoyed by its South Korean adversary. Nonetheless, 
it was entangled in that deterrence system and inhibited from 
pursuing unilateral approaches to weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and their delivery systems.3 Neither Moscow nor 
Beijing trusted North Korea sufficiently to sanction such 
experimentation. Consequently, North Korea found itself just 
as constrained as South Korea regarding WMD and long-range 
missilery, but lacking the ROK'ssecurity blanket. 
In short, the Cold War era imposed on the -two Koreas a 
high degree of reliance upon a deterrence system that was 
2 For an explanation of how that protection functioned internationally, see: Michael 
Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, 
Winter 1982-83, pp. 309-324. For broader background on that issue, see: Lawrence 
Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 
3 This did not mean that North Korea was precluded from pursuing a major armaments 
expansion in the 1960s and '70s. For an analysis of how North Korea responded 
militarily to evolving circumstances during that period, see: Han Sung-Joo, "North 
Korea's Security Policy and Military Strategy," in Robert Scalapino and Kim Jun-Yop, 
eds., North Korea Today, Korea Research Monograph No.8, U.C. Berkeley, Center for 
Korean Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1983. 
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dependent upon the missile capabilities of supportive major 
powers, but precluded participation by either Korea in either 
the production or autonomous control of truly significant 
categories of missilery. It is important to note in this regard that 
North Korea was able to begin its own small-scale missile 
program with PRC assistance in the 1960s - gradually 
expanding in the mid-to-Iate 1970s - by modifying the Soviet 
Union's SCUD-B short-range ballistic missiles and producing a 
SCUD-C version.4 These developments in North Korea were a 
by-product of Pyongyang's ability to utilize Sino-Soviet 
tensions, and Moscow and Beijing's attempts to play a Korea 
card against each other, for the DPRK's own purposes. North 
Korea was able to tum a vulnerable situation into a foreign 
policy asset.5 This gave North Korea a head start over South 
Korea and taught Pyongyang some lessons about being creative 
on the foreign policy front that it would draw upon in the future. 
On balance, however, both Koreas were part of the larger 
system, but neither could direct it. Although there are other 
important facets of this lack of control that influenced the. 
strategic thinking of both Koreas as subordinate players, for 
present purposes the most important fact is the way that these ... 
circumstances sensitized both Koreas to a geopolitical context . 
that made each country appreciative of the value assigned to . 
long-range missiles in modem warfare.·· 
A Shifting Context 
4 For background on North Korea's initial efforts and what it produced for North Korea, 
see: Joseph S. Bermudez,Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," . 
Occasional Paper No.2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of· 
International Studies, November 1999; and Lee Jung-hoon and Cho Il-Hyun, 'The North 
Korean Missiles: A Military Threat or a Survival Kit?, "The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis, Summer 2000, pp. 131-154. 
5 The roots of that dynamic are assessed in Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea's Foreign 
Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945-1975. New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1976; and Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow, University, Ala: 
University of Alabama Press, 1978. 
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As long as the U.S.-USSR Cold War remained intact as the 
context within which the two Koreas dealt with each other and 
fostered supportive networks,. neither Seoul nor Pyongyang had 
much opportunity - beyond theoretical exercises, cultivating a 
knowledge base, and pushing the arms industry envelope - to 
entertain the real world possibility of developing and deploying 
truly serious missilery. They were inhibited from doing so by 
their external backers. However, with the end of the Cold War, 
and the demise of the Soviet Union, the long established 
context suddenly changed for both Koreas. On the surface, 
South Korea emerged as the winner, while North Korea found 
itself without its most powerful backer and uncertain about the 
reliability of its other backer, the PRC, that had begun aligning 
itself with the DPRK's foremost adversary - the United States 
- throughout the 1980s and had established diplomatic ties 
with the ROK in 1992 as a result of Seoul's nordpolitik 
successes. Widely held views that North Korea had been cut 
adrift may have been overstated regarding long-run DPRK-
PRC ties, but for the short run, they were substantially accurate. 
The Cold War to post-Cold War transition was undoubtedly 
traumatic for North Korea. But as the Chinese characters used 
by Koreans to describe a "risky situation" (uigi) connotes the 
melding of a danger and an opportunity, North Koreans rapidly 
moved to make the best of a bad situation by applying their 
juche-style autonomous vision to strategic affairs through 
pursuit of options that had been largely off limits to the DPRK 
during the Cold War. 
Once more the two Koreas reacted strategically to the 
foreign affairs context they both found themselves enveloped in. 
For South Korea this involved substantial continuity because it 
remained able to rely on U.S. strategic support and preservation 
of the ROK's portion of the United States' nuclear umbrella. 
With U.S. military power on vivid display as the post-Cold War 
era's sole superpower and leader of the victorious allied 
coalition in the Gulf War, Seoul had ample reason to relish 
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continued U.S. support - even with its attendant limitations 
imposed on South Korean armament options. On the other 
hand, North Korea's only functioning operational deterrence 
entailed its ground and air forces. As numerous as they were, 
they were no match for U.S.-backed ROK forces, especially 
with the full arsenal of U.S. national power manifestly evident. 
Consequently it made sense for North Korea - finding itself no 
longer constrained by Cold War backers - to explore its 
defensive and offensive options. Clearly this included the most 
taboo options - nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of 
mass destruction and any conceivable means to deliver such 
WMD, ranging from a low-tech suitcase to sophisticated 
missilery. A major theme in U.S.-North Korean relations has 
been American reactions to North Korean efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons capabilities and the deals that were cut to 
compensate North Korea for restraining itself and fostering a 
new policy course. Although there have been a number of 
studies on the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat,6 
given the closed nature of DPRK society and the deserved 
reputation of North Korean leaders for quirky international 
policy choices, it is virtually impossible to be certain whether .' .. 
the nuclear and other threat potentials were a truly plausible 
military option intended for use in renewed warfare against; 
South Korea in an expectation of victory, or whether they,', 
primarily constituted a form of geopolitical brinkmanship'. 
predicated on a Machiavellian brand of calculated irrationality 
designed to keep the U.S.-ROK alliance off balance, induce 
diplomatic and economic concessions from Seoul and 
Washington, and establish a new category of post-Cold War ' ..
6 For mainstream examples, see: Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb; A Case 
Study in Nonproliferation, New York: S1. Martin's Press, 1995; Kihl Young-Whan and 
Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Security in Northeast Asia; The Nuclear Issue and the 
Korean Peninsula, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997; and Leon V. Segal, Disarming 
Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, Princeton: Princeton University Press, .•. 
1998. 
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deterrence based on U .S.-ROK tangible power versus a mixture 
of uncertainties and anxieties about DPRK power. 
In either case, on the nuclear front it worked well enough to 
spawn the Geneva Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and a range of 
U.S.-DPRK engagement opportunities. It also spawned a new 
level of attention to North Korea as a serious military threat in 
world affairs.? However, the more confident Seoul and 
Washington were that a lid had been placed on North Korea's 
nuclear potentials (despite some South Korean complaints 
about the degree to which Seoul had been included as a 
decision-maker,8 and sour grapes about memories of how the 
United States had previously stifled the ROK's own nuclear 
aspirations9), the more a need was fostered in North Korea to up 
the ante in an arena that was not as overtly risky as WMD. 
Against this backdrop, North Korea's formerly low key missile 
potentials became a valuable substitute geopolitical lever for 
Pyongyang to use in its international bargaining. 
Korean Missile Leverage 
As long as North Korea's serious missile capabilities were 
in the "potenialty" realm, Pyongyang's leverage - while real -
remained limited. Hence, it made sense for North Korea to 
? That degree of attention, in turn, generated serious analyses of North Korea's overall 
military capabilities. For a thorough example, see: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed 
Forces of North Korea, London & New York: LB. Tauris, 2001. 
8 For useful critiques, see: James A. Bayers, 'The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the 
Agreed Framework: How Not To Negotiate with the North Koreans," Asian Perspective, 
Fall-Winter, 1995, pp. 191-222; Kim Young-Shik, "South Korea-U.S. Relations and 
North Korea; A Cleavage In Their Approaches and Perspectives, "Korea and World 
Affairs, Fall 1996, pp. 474-491; and Moon Chung-In, Arms Control on the Korean 
Peninsula; International Penetrations, Regional Dynamics, and Domestic Structure, 
Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1996. 
9 For analyses of the ROK's thwarted nuclear ambitions, see: Ha Young-Sun, Nuclear 
Proliferation, World Order and Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983; 
and Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, 
Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991. 
US-KOREAN RELATIONS 277 
accelerate its development of such technology, originally 
borrowed from its Cold War security backers - but enhanced 
domestically by North Korean weapon~ specialists, for two 
reasons. Probably most important was its value as a concrete 
manifestation of North Korea's post-Cold War war-making 
capabilities that underscored its diplomatic leverage. But also 
of importance for an impoverished Stalinist economy was the 
means to profit from exporting missile know-how to states 
willing to deal with the North Korean regime. Since, by 
definition, these tended to be countries considered dangerous 
by the United States, such activities reinforced the leverage 
function by providing added incentives for the United States to 
engage North Korea in diplomatic processes that would trade 
reciprocal concessions - i.e., limits on North Korea missiles in 
exchange for expanded U.S. economic and political contacts 
with Pyongyang. . 
For a few years into the post-Cold War era, North Korea's 
advanced missile capabilities - real or hypothetical - were 
primarily of interest to a relatively narrow spectrum of 
intelligence specialists, proliferation analysts, and policy 
makers in the United States and South Korea. Aside from some 
press and scholarly speculation about North Korea's aspirations 
and intentions, this issue did not loom very large. The primary 
North Korean missile threat of that period was its 600-mile 
range Nodong-I missile which was assumed to be able to reach 
all of South Korea and parts of Japan. That missile was 
perceived mainly as a "force multiplier" to offset the 
technological advantages of ROK-U.S. forces. That situational 
context was altered dramatically when North Korea on August 
31, 1998 fired a new (but long rumored) Taepo-dong I missile 
over Japan, with a range of about 1,000 miles, landing in the 
Pacific Ocean. Ostensibly part of a North Korean satellite 
launching system, this test sent political shock waves through 
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Tokyo to Washington.!O 
That widely publicized test had several consequences. For 
North Korea it demonstrated that its missile aspirations were 
more than talk. While much uncertainty remained with regard 
to how viable a North Korean missile force would be in the real 
world, and what weapons they could deliver, it heightened the 
plausibility of a North Korean threat. It also, thereby, 
heightened the bargaining· leverage enjoyed by Pyongyang. 
Along those lines, speculation that North Korea was on the 
verge of a still more powerful missile, the Taepo-dong II, that 
could reach Hawaii, Alaska, and maybe the U.S. West Coast,tl 
added clout to North Korea's leverage. Because North Korea 
was selling its missile technology to Iran and Pakistan (and 
continues to do so), 12 this added to the incentives for the Clinton 
administration to press harder for talks with North Korea that 
could limit or halt both North Korea's missile development and 
its foreign sales programs. When coupled with a desire to 
facilitate the ROK's efforts to improve the North-South 
dialogue via President Kim Dae-Jung's overtures to Pyongyang, 
this accelerated U.S. engagement with North Korea led by 
former Secretary of Defense. William Perry. Although these 
U.S. efforts led some American conservatives to condemn 
Clinton policy as "appeasement," and contend that extortion 
10 For contemporary coverage of that event, see: "N. Korea claims missile lofted satelIite 
into orbit," The Korea Herald, September 5, 1998, pp. 1 & 4; and Peter Landers, Susan 
Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target, " Far Eastern Economic Review, September 
24, 1998, pp. 20-21. 
11 For examples of such speculation, see: Cameron W. Barr, "Countering North Korea; 
How to handle Asia's troublemaker," The Christian Science Monitor, July 29, 1999, pp. 
1 & 10; Warren P. Strobel and Kevin Whitelaw, "A minuet with a missile; Trying to talk 
North Korea out of making big trouble," US News & World Report, August 9,1999, pp. 
30-31; Steven Mufson," Flexing Missile Muscle; North Korea's growing arsenal raises 
fears of a regional arms race," The Washington Post (Weekly), September 13, 1999. p. 
16; and Don Kirk, "New Missile Reported in North Korea; California is Within Its 
Range, a Defector TelIs South Koreans," International Herald Tribune, February 19-20, 
2000, p.l. 
12 For details on these activities, see: Bermudez, "A History .... , " op. cit.; and Nam 
Man-kwon, ''Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Proliferation," ~ 
Koreanlournal of Defense Analysis, Summer 2000, pp. 87-108. 
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and blackmail was working for North Korea,13 the United States 
persisted. However, the United States, the ROK, and Japan 
also sternly warned North Korea not to push them too far and 
the United States revived a very limited set of plans to develop 
a missile defense system that amounted to a watered down 
version of what had been pursued in the Reagan years; this time, 
however, it would be aimed at North Korea, and others, 
specified as "rogue" states.14 
By the fall of 1999, North Korea had agreed to freeze its 
missile-testing program, making it possible for the Perry 
initiative to produce results. In turn, this led to an easing of 
sanctions against North Korea by the United States. IS This 
helped pave the way for an improved ROK-DPRK dialogue, 
and the resulting North-South summit in Pyongyang in June 
2000.16 Far less noticed within the United States, because of 
the high profile visibility of the North Korean missile and 
diplomatic issues, Washington was simultaneously coping with 
pressures from Seoul to support the ROK's development or 
acquisition of missiles with a 300-500 km range, instead of a 
lower range enforced by the United States on its ally. To put it 
mildly, South Korea was frustrated with constraints within the 
. U.S.-ROK alliance that no longer bound North Korea. As 
much as South Korea valued its alliance with the United States, 
it also wanted enough latitude to be more self-reliant and the 
13 For a succinct example, see: Richard D. Fisher, Jr., 'Time To Stop North Korea's 
Missile Blackmail," The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 550, 
September 8,1998. 
14 For an analysis of the impact of these developments on the the U.S.-Korean side and 
their meaning for U.S.-Japan relations, see: Umemoto Tetsuya, "Missile Defense and 
Extended Deterrence in the Japan-U.S. Alliance," The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis, Winter 2000, pp. 135-152. 
IS For coverage of these events, see: Shim Jae Hoon, "Umits of Brinkmanship," Far 
Eastern Economic Review, September 30, 1999, p. 20. See, also, William J. Perry, 
"Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and 
Recommendations," Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator, U.S. Department of 
State, October 19, 1999. 
16 For descriptions of that summit, see: "Kimaraderie, at last," The Economist, June 17, 
2000, pp. 41-42; and Together As One, Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, July 2000. 
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ability to maintain its own form of missile deterrence against 
North Korea.17 While the United States remained preoccupied 
by negotiating with North Korea to reduce the missile threat in 
its various manifestations, Washington also engaged Seoul in 
lower key negotiations that eventually led to South Korea being 
given more of a free hand on its own missile options. 
During the two years since the "freeze" deal was struck, 
North Korea seems to have stuck to its commitment, but it also 
manipulated foreign anxieties about the reliability of North 
Korea's word. Pyongyang promised to retain the freeze as long 
as it was getting its end of the deal, and raised the possibility 
during Russian President Putin's visit to North Korea in July 
2000 that it might abandon missiles in favor of other countries 
providing satellite launching capabilities - a notion which few 
took seriously. Had the Clinton administration been succeeded 
by a Gore administration, with the inherent continuity in U.S. 
policy that could be presumed, it is possible that the momentum 
being generated on the inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK 
diplomatic fronts may well have continued to date. However, it 
is unlikely a Gore administration would have achieved major 
progress on resolving the missile issues because it still would 
not be in North Korea's interests to lose its missile lever. 
Nevertheless, because of a Gore administration's reasons to ' 
stay committed to an on-going process, it is unlikely that the 
basic context would have changed. 
U.S. Missile Defenses & Korea 
On the other hand, with a change of U.S. administrations in 
2001 and a harder line from Washington on "appeasement" 
issues applicable to North Korea and, more important, a far 
greater emphasis on national missile defense (NMD) and 
17 For background on Seoul's concerns over the ROK's missile options, see: Kim 
Taewoo, "South Korea's Missile Dilemmas, " Asian Survey, May/June 1999, pp. 486-
503. 
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theater missile defense (TMD), the post-Cold war context for 
U.S. policy toward Korean missile issues has changed 
fundamentally. In contrast to the Clinton administration's 
preference for a tentative approach to a very limited form of 
missile defense, the George W.· Bush administration displayed 
great enthusiasm for a full fledged national missile defense 
system reminiscent of the Reagan administration's ardor for the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)IS and the ways it could be 
applied to Asia.19 Despite conventional wisdom in the late 
Clinton years that favored a distinctly limited approach to TMD 
in Asia20 and was critical - and sometimes scornful - of 
Reagan-style SDI/I the new Bush administration displayed its 
strong support for NMD by appointing as Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, who had prior experience serving as 
Secretary of Defense, and who had headed a commission that 
IS For contemporary insights into SDI's pros and cons, see: Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. 
Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technica~ 
Political, and Arms Control Assessment, Stanford: International Strategic Institute, 
1984; Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., The Star Wars Controversy, 
. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; and Scott Armstrong and Peter Grier, 
Strategic Defense Initiative: Splendid Defense or Pipe Dream?, Headline Series No. 
275, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1986. 
19 For further contemporary insights into SDI's applicability to Asia, see: Park Jae-kyu 
and Ahn Byung-Joon, eds., The Strategic Defense Initiative: Its Implications for Asia 
and the Pacific, Boulder/Seoul: Westview Press and Kyungnam University Press, 1987; 
and Michael J. Mazarr, Missile Defenses and Asia-Pacific Security, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1989. 
20 For mainstream examples, see: Michael O'Hanlon, 'Theater Missile Defense and the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance" in Mike M. Mochizuki,' ed., Toward A True Alliance; 
Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press,. 1997; Steven A. Cambone, 'The United States and Theatre Missile Defense in 
North-east Asia," Survival, Vol. 39, No.3, Autumn 1997, pp. 66-84; Patrick M. Cronin, 
Paul S. Giarra, and Michael J. Green, 'The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile 
Defense," in Green and Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance; Past, Present, and 
Future, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999; and Kenneth W. Allen, et. 
a1., Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region, A Henry L. Stimson Center 
Working Group Report, Report No. 32, Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 
June 29, 2000. 
21 For a mild critique, see: John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, "National 
Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?," Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, pp. 91-100. 
For a harsher critique, see: Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star 
Wars, and the End of the Cold War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. 
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advocated a major commitment to NMD which earned him 
vocal conservative support. 22 . 
The Bush administration's approach to NMD and TMD 
consciously, or inadvertently, transformed the United States' 
perception of North Korea's missile threat from a factor which 
had to be contained - if not eliminated - as part of a long 
standing arms control process, into a factor that should be 
contained, but also utilized as part of the rationale making the 
United States' case for defense against "rogue" states. This U.S. 
defensive posture, using North Korea's threat (along with Iran 
and Iraq's) as either a justification or a pretext (depending on 
one's perception of the Bush policy), injected new nuances into 
the Korean missile issue. 
This is yet another example of the United States' 
willingness to utilize circumstances on the Korean peninsula 
for its own purposes. There has been a long-standing readiness 
on the United States' part to make use of the tensions stemming 
from a divided Korea to serve U.S. national interests 
throughout the Cold War and its aftermath. This readiness to 
perpetuate a Korean buffer and retain a venue for forward 
deployed U.S. forces has been reinforced by Japan's vested 
interests in keeping Korea divided. While often deviating from 
the rhetoric of U.S.-ROK solidarity in support of Seoul's 
unification agenda, such U.S. policies were successfully 
finessed in the name of regional stability and South Korean 
acquiescence to a larger U.S. purpose in world affairs. Because 
much of what the United States had done along these lines was 
devised and implemented by a growing cadre of officials with 
credible expertise in Asian and Korean affairs, this made it 
easier for South Korea to tolerate the ways U.S. policy served 
22 For that advocacy, which stirred up controversy, see: Rumsfeld Commission, Report 
of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998. For a prominent example of 
conservative support for this approach to U.S. defense policy, see: James H. Anderson, 
America at Risk: The Citizen's Guide to Missile Defense, Washington, D.C.: The 
Heritage Foundation, 1999. 
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narrower U.S. interests than Koreans might prefer. That degree 
of subtlety was substantially lost when the United States' 
policies toward Korea were reshaped by post-Cold War 
developments. 
The most obvious example of this shift occurred as a by-
product of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its role as the 
focus of U.S. nuclear policies. The U.S. nuclear non-
proliferation community of experts' quest for surrogate tasks 
was part of a larger process in American society in which a new 
geopolitical focus for the United States' role in the world was 
being sought. 23 As part of this quest Americans whose 
functional expertise lay outside Korea began to focus on the 
North Korean nuclear threat based on its merits as a serious 
post-Cold War threat to the larger world. As valid as the issue 
was, an unintended result of that emphasis within U.S. policy 
was to broaden the context within which U.S. policy makers 
made their decisions about Korean affairs and led them to 
answers that were not necessarily driven by what is best for 
Korea or for the United States in Korea, but for what is best for 
the United States' role in the larger world.24 Just as U.S. policy 
toward Korea was partially co-opted in the early post-Cold war 
era by American specialists in broader nuclear and missile 
non-proliferation issues, and driven in directions determined by 
their criteria, today something similar is occurring as part of a 
broader U.S. defense reorganization which placers greater 
emphasis on U.S. national defense, including national missile 
defense. A major consequence of this shift in context is to 
change the ways the United States perceives conditions in 
Korea and determines what to emphasize. 
As a result there is reason to question the "Korean-ness" of 
23 For insights into how the latter materialized, see: Ted Galen Carpenter, A Search For 
Enemies; America's Alliances after the Cold War, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 
1992. 
24 For further analysis of that shift's broader consequences, see the author? ''U.S. 
Security Policy and the Two Koreas," World Mfairs, Spring 2000, pp. 150-157. 
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this Korean issue. Because U.S. NMD and TMD may well be 
ultimately focused on China, and may be only using North 
Korea as an interim rationale, it can be treated in a far broader 
context. Similarly, because· of Japan's utility to the United 
States within a prospective TMD system, and Tokyo's 
relatively different views of North Korean versus Chinese 
threats, this issue's "Korean-ness" is subject to profound 
second-guessing. Beyond the Northeast Asian region, negative 
reactions in Europe and Russia as to what the current Bush 
administration hopes to do with NMD and TMD in Asia have 
created opportunities for new.policy options in North Korea. 
The prominence currently given by the U.S. Department of 
Defense to the overt dangers posed by North Korea on a 
spectrum of global threats,2S confirms the strategic stature the 
DPRK has achieved, and strengthens its ability to utilize that 
stature as leverage. The ways in which North Korea as a threat 
has become a focal point for U.S. missile defense policies has 
in several perverse respects enhanced North Korea's leverage. 
In response to the United States' harder line emphasis on 
reciprocity in U.S.-DPRK talks and the United States' stance on 
NMD and TMD, North Korea's promise to keep its word on a 
missile testing "freeze" until 2003 - reiterated during Kim 
Jong-il's August 2001 Moscow visit26 - helped to place North 
Korea in a more moderate vantage point. This transpired 
without Pyongyang actually doing anything concrete and even 
though Kim Jong-il had previously - during a May 2001 
meeting with European Union (EU) officials in Pyongyang -
refused to halt North Korea's trade in missile technology 
because it had become so important to North Korea's 
economy.27 
2S See the section on North Korea in Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense; January 2001, pp. 9-13. 
26 Michael Wines, "North Korean Leader Vows To Curb Missile Program, " The New 
York Times, August 25, 2001, p. 1. 
27 Doug Struck, "N. Korean Leader To Continue Sale of Missiles," The Washington Post, 
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Kim Jong-il's Moscow visit also produced the "Moscow 
Declaration" in which North Korea and Russia affirmed their 
support for the '1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
thereby putting North Korea on the side of moderation.28 
Pyongyang's dual role as a focus of U.S. NMD and TMD 
policies and as a critic of those policies may be laden with 
hypocrisy, but the more North Korea has been able to improve 
its position vis-a-vis Russia, the PRC, and - perhaps most 
important - the states of Western Europe by sharing their 
doubts about the wisdom of U.S. anti-missile policies the more 
moderate it can pretend to be. Cumulatively, these 
developments serve to enhance North Korean leverage and 
creates opportunities for North Korea to broaden its dialogue 
with various countries that are critical of U.S. missile defense 
plans. 
Because of Pyongyang's ability to deny the United States 
the type of on-scene inspection access into North Korea's 
closed society capable of instilling American confidence, North 
Korea is able to control the degree to which the United States is 
able to utilize the DPRK as a ploy for U.S. NMD and TMD 
programs. Similarly, being able to influence - "and to some 
extent regulate - the degree to which the United States can be 
manipulative on this issue, Pyongyang possesses the means to 
deal directly with the United States, effectively bypassing 
Seoul - thereby simultaneously denigrating South Korea's 
standing internationally and helping to drive a wedge between 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. Since both of these goals have been on 
North Korea's agenda for decades, the current situation can be 
seen as valuable to Pyongyang. 
A South Korean Dilemma 
May 5, 2001, p. 13. 
28 Dave Montgomery, "Russia, N. Korea reaffirm treaty; Putin, Kim align to counter 
Bush," (Knight Ridder wire service) The Monterey Herald, August 5, 2001, pp. Al & 
A12. 
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All of these developments have left South Korea in an 
awkward position. While Seoul had no real choice other than to 
maintain the solidarity ofthe U.S.-ROK alliance, South Korean 
society was . divided because many activists opposed a 
Northeast Asian TMD.29 In terms of principles, many South 
Koreans opposed TMD because it violated the ABM Treaty's 
legacy of arms control stability. On a more pragmatic level 
they opposed the TMD concept because it: 1) was helping to 
derail the U.S.-DPRK dialogue so important to Kim Dae-
Jung's inter-Korean agenda, 2) jeopardized a variety of 
budding ROK-PRC ties, 3) raised unwanted Taiwan issues 
within U.S.-ROK-Japan TMD options, and 4) was more 
popular in Japan than in South Korea, intrinsically making the 
whole notion suspect. 30 All of these factors were objectionable 
for Seoul because they disrupted the ROK's foreign policy 
agenda. Moreover, to the extent such disruptions for South 
Korea played into North Korea's hands, perhaps by design in a 
convoluted Machiavellian manner, this added to South Korea's 
problems in pursuing its international goals. 
The manner in which South Korea was out of step with the 
United States on TMD/NMD questions, but was awkwardly 
similar to the stance being taken by North Korea, was 
exemplified by Seoul's willingness just prior to the Bush-Kim 
summit, March 7, 2001, to support the ABM treaty in ways that 
rewarded Russia's on-going support for Seoul's notion of how 
29 For an example of such concerns, see: Soh Ji-young, "Civic Groups United To Block 
US Missile Defense Programs," The Korea Times, April 10,2001, p. 1. For further 
background on Seoul's reactions to the TMD idea early in the Bush administration, see: 
"Seoul Remains Concerned About NMD," The Korea Times, January 29, 2001, p. 1; and 
"Korea Not Considering TMD, Minister Says," The Korea Herald, February 22, 2001, p. 
1, in which Defense Minister Cho Seung-tae states "We're studying an alternative (to the 
TMD) out of the view that we need to build own own missile defense system that fits our 
circumstances. " 
30 For an assessment of the relative roles of China, Taiwan, and Japan on this issue, see: 
"Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, 
Beijing, and Tokyo," The Stanley Foundation and the Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001. 
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North Korea should be persuaded to drop its missile 
ambitions.3l The awkwardness of this juxtaposition with North 
Korea's perverse forms of leverage was reinforced by South 
Korea's continued progress from mid-2000 to mid-2001 in 
getting U.S. acceptance of South Korea's ability to cease 
abiding by a 1979 U.S.-ROK agreement that South Korea 
would not build missiles capable of more than a short 112 mile 
range, intended to avoid precipitating a missiles arms race on 
the Korean peninsula. In that regard, in January 2001, South 
Korea agreed to sign the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR - with 32 countries) in March 2001, allowing South 
Korea's missile range to rise to 300 km (190 miles), and 
enabling it to have some autonomous deterrence over much of 
North Korea.32 While this was a success for the ROK, it struck a 
discordant note when compared with Seoul's supposed efforts 
to induce Pyongyang to back off missiles entirely. 
One of the inadvertent revelations stemming from South 
Korea's awkwardness was the inherent ambivalence in South 
Korea's overall posture regarding North Korea's nuclear and 
missile realities and potentials. There is no doubt that South 
Korea wants the United States to be a steadfast ally of the ROK, 
to prevent North Korea from engaging in reckless acts against 
the ROK, and to succeed in the short-term (i.e., pre-unification) 
efforts to deter North Korea and facilitate an inter-Korean 
dialogue.33 However, there is' ample reason to suspect that 
3l Patrick E. Tyler, "South Korea Takes Russia? Side In Dispute Over U.S. Missile 
Defense Plan," The New York Times, February 28, 2001, p. 1. For the impact this 
position had on U.S.-Korean relations, see: Shin Yong-bae, "Summit Sparks 
International Controversy Over NMD," The Korea Herald, March 2,2001, p. 1. 
32 For coverage of this sequence of events, see: Calvin Sims, "South Korea Plans To 
Begin Rocket Program," The New York Times, January 15,2000, p. 1; Don Kirk, ''U.S. 
To Back Seoul's Plans For Extended "South Korea Plans Enhanced Missiles," The 
Washington Times, January 18, 2001, p. 1. 
33 The author explores Seoul's desires in that regard and U.S. policy responses in greater 
detail in his ''United States Policy Toward The Inter-Korean Dialogue" in Oh Kongdan 
and Ralph Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation 
and Reunification, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe and The Asia Society, 2001. 
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South Korea does not really want North Korea to be totally 
"de-fanged" with regard to its nuclear and missile know-how 
and capabilities because a post-unification Korean state -
presumably governed from Seoul - has many reasons to want 
to inherit all of those attributes. Were the United States to 
succeed totally in its efforts to eliminate North Korea's nuclear 
and missile capabilities and potentials, and be in an enhanced 
position to exert pressures on Seoul to abandon any ambitions 
to develop the ROK'S missile capacities, neither Korea would 
possess the wherewithal to defend itself against the other Korea 
with missiles. However, such U.S. non-proliferation progress 
would leave both Koreas without the missile capabilities that a 
unified Korean state may well wish to possess. Such a 
prospective united Korea. would find such capabilities 
eminently useful in its geopolitical relations with Japan, China, 
Russia, and - perhaps - with the United States too. 
Missile Policy Prospects 
The ways in which North Korea and South Korea today, 
and a united Korea in the future, deal with their security 
through the creative use of military strengths and 
vulnerabilities - plus the concerns their policies generate 
among an array of countries - underscores a theme stressed 
previously. Korean security, from any Korean perspective, is 
dependent upon an evolving geopolitical context. The Korean 
missile issue is widely perceived as a North Korean topic, but it 
is also a South Korean and an American issue by virtue of their 
responses to North Korea. Perhaps more importantly, by virtue 
of the impact that ROK and U.S. responses have had on broader 
South Korean and U.S. security policies bilaterally, regionally, 
and globally, the context has been evolving in different respects 
as the ROK and the United States cope with the challenges and 
opportunities presented by missile defense options from 
radically separate national interest vantage points. 
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From the United States' strategic vantage point, missile 
defense is a plausible proposition. For many Americans it is 
highly desirable, although others remain unconvinced. For 
those who seek to make NMD a centerpiece of the United 
States' defense system, there is a willingness and readiness to 
pay high financial costs to develop and implement such a 
system. The United States also seems prepared to pay a high 
price in terms of U.S.-Korean relations if necessary to meet U.S. 
defensive goals. The strong desire for such a defensive system 
in the United States raises a complex set of issues for both 
Koreas. The degree to which the United States is prepared to 
utilize North Korea's threat potentials for the United States' 
own purposes causes problems for both Koreas in terms of U.S. 
manipulation of the issue and in terms of the spill over effects 
on each Korea's foreign and defense policies. Some of these 
effects are more obvious such as the negative impact on the 
inter-Korean dialogue, the mixed impact on each Korea's 
international leverage, and uncertainties generated about 
stability on the Korean peninsula. 
On the other hand, some potential spills over effects are less 
likely to be noticed. For example, the United States' pursuit of 
a NMD system, with its very high developmental costs - that 
are likely to produce shifts in U.S. defense budget priorities -
might well have unanticipated repercussions for U.S. force 
levels in Korea if the U.S. Army experiences further worldwide 
redeployments amid a changing approach to preparing to fight 
two regional wars simultaneously. Along that same line, if the 
United States is able to deploy a viable NMD system, an 
argument can be made that it would have less need for some 
forward deployments in the name of deterrence. Korea could 
be a candidate for such U.S. force cuts. Yet another spill over 
effect of the United States pursuing a missile defense system is 
the prospect that North Korea will experience so much pressure 
from South Korea, the PRe, Russia, the EU, and others in the 
international community to undermine the United States' MND 
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efforts by preemptively accepting severe limits on the DPRK's 
missile capabilities, that Pyongyang will succumb to those 
pressures. This is made fairly likely by the fervor of the critics 
of U.S. policies and their abilities to help North Korea resolve 
its domestic problems. It is made still more likely by the 
probability that North Korea is all too well aware that it cannot 
really compete with the United States in this arena and has 
something to gain diplomatically, politically, and economically 
by shifting course. Lest one should think that such a 
development would mean that North Korea would no longer 
pose a threat, it is important to note the all too real possibility 
that North Korea already possesses a serious threat in an 
entirely different context - namely cyber war and cyber 
terrorism, an arena where the DPRK already has garnered 
attention as a competitive player.34 
The United States' missile policy positions vis-a-vis Korea 
undoubtedly will be influenced by the. ways in which 
Americans cope with the ''war on terrorism" being waged under 
the leadership of the Bush administration, following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and at the 
Pentagon. It remains unclear as of this writing (late October 
2001) how the U.S. focus on foreign terrorist threats and 
attention to homeland security will affect American policies 
toward Korea. In one sense, the United States' preoccupation 
with the Southwest Asian and Middle Eastern support systems 
for the terrorist threats faced by Americans may well become a 
distraction from Washington's willingness to focus on Korean 
affairs. Were this to occur, it could prove to be a negative 
factor if its leads to the Bush administration being inattentive to 
opportunities in Korea. However, it also could be beneficial if 
34 For examples of the attention paid to North Korea in this strategic arena by the United 
States and the ROK? Korean Information Security Agency (KISA), see: Charles Bickers, 
"Combat on The Web," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 16, 2001, pp. 30-33; and 
Kim Deok-Hyun, ''War Games Launched To Fight Cyber Terrorism, " The Korea Times, 
August 21, 2001, p. 1. 
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American specialists in Korean affairs were given greater 
latitude in shaping U.S. policy during a period when senior U.S. 
officials are immersed in Middle Eastern affairs. Although it is 
possible that Washington will be distracted from Korean issues 
for a while, it is not likely to be a lasting distraction because the 
issues at stake in Korea have intrinsic importance to the United 
States' evolving security policy. 
Despite the U.S. war on terrorism's high profile, it has not 
caused the United States to deviate from it~ significant focus on 
missile defense. In fact, the terrorist attacks-induced attention 
to homeland security has helped to generate an even greater 
desire for effective means to defend the United States from 
external attack. As the Bush administration's Quadrennial 
Defense Review attests,35 the United States is firmly on the path 
to creating a viable national missile defense program. President 
Bush reaffirmed that goal during his October 11, 2001 press 
conference when he responded to a question about U.S. plans to 
pursue missile defenses in the wake of the terrorist attacks: "A 
terrorist thug and/or a host nation might have the ability to 
develop - to deliver a weapon of mass destruction via a 
rocket... Wouldn't it be in our nation's advantage to be able to 
shoot it down?"36 Because North Korea, still characterized by 
the United States as a terrorist state, is a palpable example of 
the kind of threat that justifies U.S. efforts to build a national 
missile defense system, there is a strong likelihood that it will 
continue to be used as a rationalization for American defense 
programs. 
Unless something happens regarding North Korea to 
35 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, U.S. Department of 
Defense. See, also, Spring Baker, 'Talking Points: Terrorist Attack on America 
Confirms The Growing Need for Missile Defense," The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, No. 1477, September 20, 2001; Lee Bockhorn, "A New Day For Missile 
Defense", Weekly Standard.com, October 12, 2001; and Philip H. Gordon and Michael 
E. O'Hanlon, "Sept. 11 Verdict: Yes To Missile Defense, "Los Angeles Times, October 
17,2001, Op-ed page. 
36 Quoted in 'Text of Bush news conference," The Associated Press, October 11, 2001, 
http://www.latimes.comlnews/nationworld/wire/sns-worldtrade--1 011 bush-text.story. 
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exacerbate Americans' image of the DPRK as a rogue terrorist 
state - such as revelations of North Korean linkages to the 
terrorists who attacked the United States -- it is unlikely that 
American leaders will intensify their utilization of North Korea 
as an instrument for attaining U.S. anti-missile defense policy 
goals. In other words, while circumstances may not get any 
better, neither will they get any worse. One can only hope no 
such linkages will emerge. 
Cumulatively these factors further reinforce the point about 
the evolving missile contexts of North Korea, South Korea, and 
the United States becoming part of a larger pattern of 
transforming the U.S.-Korean relationship over time. There is 
no doubt that these sophisticated weapons and the diplomatic 
versus technological approaches to coping with the threats that 
they pose are a determining factor in U.S.-Korea relations 
today. This factor is reinforced by growing concerns within the 
United States regarding homeland security. The extent to 
which Korean issues will shape the missile context as 
compared to missile issues shaping the Korean context remains 
to be seen. For Koreans in both Koreas the appropriate priority 
seems clear. That is much less obvious with regard to U.S. 
national interests vis-a-vis U.S. national security and U.S. 
interests in Korea. Americans' choices may not mesh well with 
Korean preferences. Moreover, it is uncertain whether either 
Korea, or both, or a future united Korea will be able to persuade 
Americans to adjust U.S. national defense goals vis-a-vis NMD 
to accommodate Korean desires. 
Given South Korea's manifest desire for a stable strategic 
relationship with the United States, that Seoul anticipates 
transferring someday to ties between the United States and a 
united Korea, the ROK's policy options are constrained by the 
existing missile contexts within and surrounding the Korean 
peninsula. In light of the relative national power of the United 
States versus the ROK, Seoul's ability to persuade American 
leaders to pursue goals that transparently serve South Korean 
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interests more than they serve U.S. interests is severely limited. 
Nevertheless, because there are 'many issues where the national 
interests of the United States and the ROK overlap so much that 
the definitional lines are blurred, Seoul has available a range of 
policy options that it might consider pursuing. 
The most pragmatic, and therefore most likely, policy 
option for South Korea amidst this complexity of missile 
contexts is to adopt a rhetorically supportive, wait-and-see 
posture. Seoul can cautiously offer incremental support for the 
United States' missile defense stance, mixed with continued 
solid support for U.S. non-proliferation policies. The latter will 
be easier than the former because of the uncertainties 
surrounding precisely what the United States will do about 
missile defenses and how fast it may succeed. Nonetheless, if 
the United States does not deviate froin its missile defense goal, 
South Korea would find it prudent to adapt to that goal and 
make the best of it on a gradual basis. However, if Seoul is 
willing to be more experimental, it might pursue other 
alternatives. . 
For example, Seoul could b~ more explicit about the merits 
of stronger South Korean missile capabilities as a means to 
prepare for stronger defenses on the part of an eventual unified 
Korean state that can make productive use of whatever that 
state would inherit from the former North Korea, casting its 
argument in terms of a more stable regional balance of power 
between a unified Korea, China, and Japan. This might be 
persuasive to Americans as a long-term hedge against 
instability. The possibility that a united Korea could also 
contemplate closer strategic ties with China and/or Japan in the 
future if it felt threatened might make South Korean more 
candid about the utility of missile based deterrence more 
plausible to Americans. While this policy option could prove 
productive, it remains problematical because of its inherent 
risks. 
A safer yet innovative supplemental option would be to 
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reemphasize the virtues for U.S.-Korean relations that stemmed 
from U.S. policy toward Korea in the 1950s, '60s, '70s, and '80s 
incrementally becoming sounder as a result of the United States 
cultivating and using American expertise in Korean affairs. 
This is largely understood in the U.S. policy community of Asia 
specialists, but not necessarily recognized or appreciated by the 
broader pool of U.S. foreign policy and security policy experts. 
If Seoul were to more explicitly express its confidence in such 
U.S. expertise, and offer overt support for the former trend that 
has been partially eclipsed by nuclear and missile expertise, it 
might engender a greater sense of balance between U.S. 
interests that are helpful for Korea and U.S. interests that are 
primarily focused on what is best for the United States. While 
South Korean efforts along those lines would be seen as self-
serving, as they clearly would be, they might nonetheless help 
foster an improved policy equilibrium within the spectrum of 
U.S.-Korean relations that warrants the label "overlapping." 
Yet another possible policy alternative for South Korea 
would be for Seoul to use its admittedly limited leverage -
bilaterally and, perhaps, through Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo 
- to try to induce North Korea to playa positive brand of 
diplomacy in the current international anti-terrorist campaignY 
Since the U.S. view of North Korea's role in global terrorism is 
skeptical at best and deeply .suspicious at worst, the terrorist 
attacks on the United States inadvertently have created an 
opportunity for Pyongyang to shift gears by helping the U .S.-
led coalition through revealing whatever North Korea has 
learned over the years about terrorist groups that are of such 
obvious concern to the United States today. If North Korea can 
be persuaded to learn from Moscow and Beijing by helping the 
United States meet its anti-terrorists objectives via such 
cooperation, at a minimum it would go far toward eradicating 
37 Seoul's initial perception of North Korea's position in this terrorism crisis was 
relatively optimistic. See, ''DPRK Stance Towards Terrorist Attacks on the U.S." 
Korean Unification Bulletin, No. 35, September 2001, p. 07. 
US-KOREAN RELATIONS 295 
the DPRK's association with state-sponsored terrorism. It also 
would create conditions conducive to U.S.-DPRK tension 
reduction that would diminish U.S. readiness to utilize North 
Korea's potentials as a rationale behind American missile 
defense programs. Although there are many hypothetical 
benefits from such an option, it is much easier said than done. 
Nonetheless, it might prove feasible and warrants 
consideration.38 
Coping with these issues and differences today and in the 
near- to mid-term future could cause tensions in U.S.-Korean 
relations. Compromise may be possible if the United States 
decides to jettison North Korea as the focus of its NMD agenda, 
in favor of some other "rogue" state. Moreover, the entire 
context precipitated by the United States' emphasis on missile 
defense could evaporate if the American electorate selects a 
president in 2004, 2008, or beyond who abandons the NMD 
concept. In short, just as the United States has altered the 
context for U.S.-Korean relations significantly in the past year 
or so, Washington could do so again. However, neither Seoul 
nor Pyongyang would be prudent to expect such a shift to occur, 
especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks and the United 
States' new emphasis on homeland security. If genuine 
progress is made on NMD in the short term, even if it requires 
manipulation of circumstances in Korea, the resulting 
defensive system may well become thoroughly integrated into 
U.~. national strategy. Just as Koreans should anticipate and be 
prepared for such a trend, so too should Americans not lose 
sight of the fundamental Korean context which always 
undergirds Korean thinking about international affairs -
namely the ultimate objective of reuniting the long divided 
38 For an analysis of a related theme, namely the ways in which the anti-terrorist 
campaign being led by the United States could induce North Korea to become more 
responsive to genuine economic reforms that would draw it out of isolation, see Bertil 
Lintner and Yoon Suh-Kyung, "North Korea; Coming In From The Cold, "Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 25, 2001, pp. 60-65. 
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nation and doing what is necessary to make it a successful 
country in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the long term U.S. 
policy makers should bear in mind that the impact of their 
actions vis-a-vis a South Korean ally and a North Korean 
"rogue" state adversary will leave a profound legacy for future 
U.S. relations with a united Korea. 
